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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
~T.\T'E

OF UT'AH,

Plaintiff- Respondent,
vs.
JA~IE~

Case No.

10065

EDWARD BRYAN,
Defendant- Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEJIEXT OF THE NATURE OF CASE

This i8 a criminal action. The defendant was charged
with Automobile Homicide of a friend who was a passenger in the car of the defendant, wherein the wife of
the deceased and the wife of the defendant were likewise
pa~~Pllg"('rs and killed.

DISPOSITION IN LO\YER COURT
The case was tried to a jury in the District Court
of ~alt Lake County. Judge Ray Yan Cott, Jr., presided.
The defendant was convicted and appeals.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and dismissal of the information as a matter of law; or, that
failing, a new trial.
ST·AT·EMENT OF FACTS
On the 1st day of June, 1963, the defendant had
driven his automobile into a flat-bed truck which was
parked along side State Street in Salt Lake County.
The defendant et ux and the deceased et ux had been
together that evening in a social capacity. All four had
been drinking whiskey. The defendant was the sole
survivor of the accident.
When the investigating officers arrived at the scene,
the defendant was sitting on the sidewalk near a fire
hydrant away from his automobile ( T. 8) holding a
handkerchief to his forehead in aid of a laceration reeeived in the accident which required stitches. (T. 177)
The arresting officer never saw the defendant drive the
automobile or even as an occttpant of it. (T. 177) The
defendant was not arrested at the scene. (T. 187, 19·6)
All four occupants of the automobile were taken to
the Salt Lake County General Hospital for treatment.
Among other things, the defendant was placed under
arrest by Officer Steinfelt ( T. 196, 197, 192, 212 for
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thP rrimP of Op~"rnting a Jlotor Yehicle \Yhile Under
Tht> In fhwnr.P of Intoxicating Liquor, a m isdemra nor,
i nviolation of -t-1-fi--t--t- (a) U.C ...J., 19;)::3, before the blood
wn~ t•'\l radP<l frmn his person for purposes of a chemical
tP~t to detennine the percentage of blood alcohol volume
hy \n•ight therein.
A f t i 111 e of arrest, the arresting officer had no pro b-

nhle eau~P to believe a felony had been committed, be<·nuse all four occupants wPrP still alive and being treated
(T. 190) at the hospital, though the deceased et ux and
the wife of the defendant did in fact die later the next
day.

Though tlwre seems to be dispute as to proper prorPdure being followed with respect to chemical tests
and l't'Y<wation of licenses ( -H-6-44.10, U.C.A., 1953, as
mtwndPd in 1959), there is no dispute about the arresting
ot'l'i<'Pr suggest iJiq the defendant submit to a blood test
(T 1G6) and arrested hin1 before he submitted.
The attending intern had this to say, inter alia, con<'Prning the consent of the defendant to the extraction
oi' the blood sample after his arrest:
.. He didn't really object. He was not exactly
-

I would not state he ·was very willing, or co-

operative, but he did not place any great protest
against this." (T. :.2::3-t)
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. All I can remember is the general impression. There was no physical abuse, or even
marked verbal abuse. It's just that in my impression, or terms, the patient was not exactly cooperative in this. (T. 242, 243)

"

" ... not without restrictions." (T. 243)
" ... did not want blood taken." (T. 243)
" ... reluctantly complied." (T. 243)
". . . could I possibly keep him here for 24
hours -meaning in the hospital- for the purhe felt would force him into making some sort
of a confession or statement." (T. 246, 247)
" ... asked only about blood test, no urine, no
breath." (T. 244, 245)
All of which followed the illegal arrest.
After the defendant had been stitched, seized, stuck
and searched, he was taken before a committing magistrate in Salt Lake County, where a complaint and warrant of arrest were first obtained for his being charged
with any crime. (T. 27)
He was booked in the Salt Lake County Jail for
drunk driving ( T. 30), a charge which is still pending.
1
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There wa~ no arrP~ t nor cmnplaint for public intoxication. (T. :1~)
.\ <'omplaint for autmnobile homicide was signed
three or four days after the accident and after and be('aww of n·ePipt of the results of the blood test (T.34),
which wa~ the only other evidence received after the
inY~·~tigation of the accident of the accident the night it
hnppPned and the signing of the felony complaint for
whi('h tlw defendant stood trial, was convicted and now
appt>c.ll~.

POINT I
(and only)

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO
EVIDENCE THE CHEMICAL RESULTS OF A SAMPLE
OF BLOOD WHICH WAS EXTR.A:CTED FROM THE PER~0~

OF THE DEFENDANT FOLLOWING AN UNLAWFUL

ARREST IN VIOLATION OF STATE STATUTE AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF DUE PROCESS AFFORDED
APPELLANT AGAINST ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE.

"In our state we have a nde of reason under ·Title
17-l:~-:~. rtah Code Annotated, 1953, which allows a peace
officer to arrPst without warrant" (State v. Louden, _____ _
l?tah ....... 1963, 3Si P. 2d 240, Henroid, C. J., concurring)
1) one comn1itting a misdemeanor or felony in his pres-
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ence, and 3) where a felony has been committed and the
officer has reasonable cause to believe the arrested person committed it.
Likewise, in our state we have a rule of law under
Title 76-28-52, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which makes
it a crime for a police officer under pretense of legal authority to arrest any person ... or seize ... without a
regular process or other lawful authority.
In the instant case, the defendant had been arrested
for a misdemeanor that was not committed in the presence of the arresting officer. Nor did the arresting officer have probable cause to believe a felony had been
committed prior to his arrest of the defendant, because
no one had to that time died as a result of the accident.
(T. 171, 190) Furthermore, no legal process for arrest
or search had been obtained.
~The

arrest of the defendant was, in a word, illegal.

The search of the person of the defendant by extracting his blood was, in a ·word, unreasonable.
Inter alia, before a search can be reasonable, it
must, as a matter of law, be incidental to a lawful arrest.
(C. J. S., Criminal Law, Sec. 657(7), pp. 601, 602, n. 97,
citing cases from Cal., Del., Fla., Ill., Ind., Ky., :Mich.,
Miss., Mo., l\T ont., Okl., Tenn., \Vash., \V. Ya., and Wis,;

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

n. (

'al.. ~11 F. Supp. :~S7, Rios v, [Tnitnl Stall's, 1~)(i0, :~li-t lr. S. :2;>:-~, .1/iller v. l'nited Statrs,
l~l.\". :~;>7 F. S. 301. . . lccarino L'. (;uited States, D. C. Cir.
1~)-l!l, 1'7!l F. :2d -t.)li, IJlapp 1'. Ohio, 1961, 367 F. S. 643,
.-t al, Pt al, et al. SPP a1~o, -t!l Iowa L. R. 1-t, 1963, 55
X. II'. I.~. n. ;>:2;) Pt al, d al. et al.)

llllrst /'. f)I'OJJII'.

1

•

(

If tlH• arn·~t is in incidental to the search, and the
~<>areh is not incidental to the lawful arre~t, the evidence
must be excluded. (Cuited States v. Block, S. D.-N. Y.,
19fi~. :20:2 F. Snpp. 70G.)

If thP purpose of the arrest is 1nerely to conduct the
~Pareh, the evidence is inadmissible. (Jones v. United
,"-.'fates, l !);>~. ~i;)8 1~. S. -+~);-~, Lefkmritz vs. United States,
1!1:~:2. :2~;) U. S. -t.):2, TVortlzingtou v. r 11ifed States, 6th
l'ir., l!l+~. 166 F. :2<i 557, Papalli r. lTnit(>d States, 9th
l'ir .. 1936, S-t F. :2<i 160, Henry v. United States, 1959,
:~111 l T. S. !l~. SO S. Ct. 1 (i~. -l L. Ed. 2d 13-±, People v, Allen,
1!)('')
•)1 -t1 \_·, ~ • •)l
I:"'~)
. ),),_( ------· •)t)C
-·
• R • -t0.)
.
{'1

-\

.. A search or seizure made pursuant to a valid con~\·nt before any illegal police conduct occurs is obviously
not a product of illegal conduct. A search and seizure
made pursuant to consent secured immediately following
an illegal eut ry or a rrcst, however, is inextricably bound
up with the illegal conduct and cannot be segregated

therpfrom." People r. Harl'll, 1963, 59 C. 2d 713, 31 C.
R. -+7. :i~l P. :2d 9:27. St>e also, State

1:.

Lounden, rtah,
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1963, 387 P. 2d 240, Henroid, C. J ., concurring, page 2-t-5,
wherein it is concededly reasoned that evidence discovered as to the crime charged having been seized following
an illegal entry "might be inadmissible, as offensive to
the American traditional sense of fair play alone,- not
necessarily because of the IV Amendment or any other
Amendment - although the Mapp case puts it on the
latter ground ... ")
Nor can there be any consent, which must be decided
as a matter of law, (People v. Chavez, 1962, 208 C. A.
2d 248, 24 C. R. 895, People 1i. Haven, 1963, 59 C. 2d 713,
31 C. R. 47, 38'1 P. 2d 927), where the defendant acts in
fear. (T. 246, 247) (Castaneda v. Superior Court, 1963,
59 C. 2d 439, 30 C. R. 1, 380 P. 2d 641)
The results of the blood test was evidence in the
instant case which was, in a word, inadmissable. The
trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress that evidence ( T. 264) which was timely made
before and during trial (T. 2, 3, 4). The trial court
further erred in admitting that blood test result into
evidence (T. 103, 264), in denying defendant's motion
to dismiss the information and in permitting the jury
to determine that issue of the case. ('T. 265)
Imagine! The trial court stated that it did not think
thPrP was any issue in the instant case concerning whether or not the defendant's contitutional rights were vio-
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9
lntrd in taking tlw blood tPst. (T. l!l:l) ThP trial court
nppnrently limitPd its roncern to the propriety necessary
for rP\'ot·at ion of liePnS(' when driver refuses sobriety
t~ •:·d.

BPfleeted realization that the courts of our state
hnY<' hlin<ll~·: n•vpred antiquity in approving unison,
while illPgally obtained evidence slithered through the
halls of jnstieP and bolted into the rooms of jury deliberat inn, would <·ansP a casual observer to understand why
the trial eourt failed to recognize this fundamental constitutional right of the accused. Nevertheless, understanding is one thing. Tolerance is quite another. Another
that eannot be- at so great an expense as the liberty and
fredom of a lnunan being. The logic and the language
of rnited RtatPs Supreme Court in the Mapp case et al
will not permit the continuation of our former state rule
of admissibility of illegally obtained evidence .
.. The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the
~tates tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest.
Having once recognized the right to privacy embodied in
the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States,
and that the right to be secure against rude invasions
of prinwy by state officers is, therefore, constitutional
in Prig-in, we can no longer permit that right to remain
an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same
manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by the Due Process of Clause, we can no longer permit it
to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in
the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend
its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and
truth, gives to the individual no more that that which
the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no
less than that which honest law enforcement is entitled
to, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary
in the true administration of justice." (Mapp vs. Ohio,
367, u.s. c. 43)
Consoling, indeed, it is that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are accepted by the courts of
our state ... and there is "no disposition to disagree with
the doctrine that where police officers have obtained
evidence by illegal methods, such as unlawful search in
violation of the IV Amendment to the V nted States
Constitution and Article 1, Section 14 of our Constitution
it should not be used to convict a person of a crime."
(State v. Louden, Utah, 1963, 387 P. 2d 240, also Henroid,
C. J., concurring.)
Disappointing, indeed, it is that we are expected to
overlook and not rebuke law enforcement officers, at the
expense of the liberty of an accused, for their unintentional violation of the law. If they are to enforce the law,
surely they should not violate the law. And if the accused
is "presumed to know the law," wherein it is hammered
home to him that "ignorance of the law is no excuse,"
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why tlwn, pray tPll, should not thP same apply to the
ol'l'i1·t·r? I~:spt>eiall~· wiH·n· he not only violates state
law and tlw supreme law of our land, the Constitution of
tlw llnitP<l ~tat<·~, but also com1nits a crime himself by
:-;o doinp;!
"\\'itlt respect to the instant case, our course is
<'lt•ar under our ~tate statute without any Mapp to guide
11~." (State v. Louden, Utah, 1963 38'7 P. 2d 240, Henroid,
C.. I. concurring), that is, the search was incidental to
an ill~·gnl aiTPst, and the evidence is inadmissible in the
in:-;tant case.
CONCLUSION
The defendant has been denied due process of law
which is guaranteed by our State and Federal Constitution and ~tatntPs. He has been deprived of a fair trial
before an impartial jury. His conviction is not substantiated hy the PYidPnce. The trial and verdict constitute
a misrarriage of justice and should be reversed.
Respectfullly submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN,
-±10 Empire Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Counsel for Appellant
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